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Abstract
In a competitive sport, every little thing matters. Yet, many sports leave some large levers out of
the reach of the teams, and in the hands of fate. In cricket, world’s second most popular sport by
some measures, 1 one such lever—the toss—has been subject to much recent attention. Using a
large novel dataset of 44,224 cricket matches, we estimate the impact of winning the toss on the
probability of winning. The data suggest that winning the toss increases the chance of winning
by a small (∼ 2.8%) but signiVcant margin. The advantage varies heftily and systematically, by
how closely matched the competing teams are, and by playing conditions—tautologically,
winning the toss in conditions where the toss grants a greater advantage, for e.g., in day and
night matches, has a larger impact on the probability of winning.
∗The paper beneVtted from comments by Andrew Gelman, Donald Green, and Daniel Stone. Scripts used to
scrape the data, the Vnal data set, and scripts used for analysis can be found at: https://github.com/dwillis/toss-up.
†Gaurav is an independent researcher. He can be reached at: gsood07@gmail.com
‡Derek is a news applications developer at ProPublica. He can be reached at: dwillis@gmail.com
1See B. R. (2011) in The Economist.
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In nearly all cricket matches, it is claimed that there is a clear advantage to either bowling or
batting Vrst. The advantage is pointed to by commentators, by the team captains in the pre-toss
interview, and by the captain of the losing team in the post-match interview. And to wrest the
said advantage, the captain merely needs to pick the side of the coin that will be left facing the
sky after the toss. And while this method of granting advantage is fair on average, the system
isn’t fair in any one game.
At Vrst glance, this imbalance seems inevitable. After all, someone has to bat Vrst. One can,
however, devise a baseball like system, with a series of short innings woven together. If that
violates the nature of the game too much, one can easily create pitches that don’t deteriorate
appreciably over the course of a match. Or, one can come up with an estimate of the advantage,
and adjust the scores accordingly, akin to an adjustment that is issued when the matches are
shortened due to rain.
None of this to say that there is actually an advantage in winning the toss, or that teams are
able to successfully exploit any such advantage. For it may be impossible to predict well in
advance the advantage of bowling or batting Vrst. (If pre-match assessments of the pitch by media
commentators are anything to go by, error in assessment of conditions is likely large.) Or, it may
be that teams squander the potential advantage by using bad heuristics to choose what they do.
For instance, teams may weigh outcomes from recent matches ‘too’ heavily; e.g., a team that has,
of late, won chasing may choose to chase even though pitch conditions favor batting Vrst.
To assess the net observed advantage of winning the toss, we exploit data from a novel
dataset of over 43,000 Vrst-class men’s cricket matches— to our knowledge, the largest ever
dataset assembled for the question, and nearly 50–100 times larger than used in prominent
previous attempts (see, Dawson et al., 2009; De Silva and Swartz, 1998). In analyzing these data,
we avoid a common but important pitfall that some other studies on the topic fall into. To avoid
post-treatment bias (see Acharya, Blackwell and Sen, 2015), unlike Dawson et al. (2009), Shafqat
(2015), etc., we do not condition on post coin-toss decisions. We Vnd that winning the toss grants
a small but signiVcant advantage, but that advantage varies considerably and systematically. We
next assess whether the advantage of winning the toss varies, broadly speaking, by how closely
matched the teams are, and by how large an advantage winning the toss grants—the advantage of
winning the toss is greater in certain playing conditions than others. We Vnd that the advantage
of winning the toss varies widely and systematically, in expected ways.
Data
Data are from 44,224 Vrst-class cricket matches. It is a near census of the relevant population.2
We have data on all types of matches: domestic and international Twenty20s—T20s and T20Is
respectively, domestic and international one-dayers—List A and One-Day Internationals (ODI)
respectively, and domestic and international multi-day matches — First Class (FC) and Tests
respectively.3
Of the 44,224 matches, 1,019 matches were abandoned without play. We exclude these
2Data excludes scheduled matches that were abandoned without the toss being conducted.
3There is a rich variety of Vrst-class matches. In English county cricket, Vrst-class matches last four days. Some
Vrst class matches last just a day. Others two days. Yet others three days. And till a particular point in history, a test
match lasted as long as it was needed to Vnish a game. We elide over such diUerences.
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matches. In another 1,376 matches, we do not have information on whether the team chose to bat
or bowl after the toss. Informal inspection suggests that data are missing because no match was
played. We excludes these matches as well.
In limited overs cricket, a minimum number of overs must be bowled to establish a result. In a
one-day match, for instance, each side must bat at least 20 overs for a result to be declared. In 769
matches, or roughly 1.7% of the total matches, not enough overs were bowled to get a result. We
exclude these matches from our analysis. This leaves us with data from 41,060 matches. We
analyze these data.
Analyses and Results
We assume that the outcome of a toss is random. Conditional on the outcome of a toss being
random, the eUect of winning the toss can be attributed to the toss itself. Any decision made after
the outcome of the toss is known, however, is ‘post-treatment.’ In particular, the decision to bat or
bowl Vrst is made after accounting for the relative strengths and weaknesses vis-à-vis the
competing team at that particular instance, and thus not independent of team attributes. Hence,
conditioning on decision to bowl or bat Vrst can bias estimates of advantage of winning a toss.
Thus, unlike Dawson et al. (2009), Shafqat (2015), we solely rely on the assumption that the
outcome of a toss is random.
But before we exploit the design, we shed some light on the validity of the assumption. In
particular, we assess whether the coin toss is somehow rigged, with the home side enjoying the
rub of the green more often. For this analysis, we only get to exploit international matches as
establishing which of the teams is the home team in local matches is somewhat arduous. Of the
5,684 international matches for which we can match the country of the ground to the country of
one of the teams, the home team won the toss in 2,892 matches, or about 50.87%. The chance of
getting as many wins by Wuke after tossing 5,684 coins is about 18.91%. The chance is low, but not
eyebrow raisingly so.
However, rather than consider all home matches, we may instead want to only consider
matches that are oXciated only by home umpires—the norm till 1992.4 In matches featuring
umpires from only the home country, the team with ‘home umpire’ advantage won toss nearly
51.9% of the times. And the chance of getting a greater percentage of wins than 51.9% in 2,965 is a
shade less than 4%. Thus, there is some reason to worry that the tosses are rigged. Any such
rigging would bias estimates of advantage of winning the coin toss to the extent that it is
correlated with ability. More plainly, if stronger teams win more tosses, estimates of the
advantage of the coin toss would be inWated upwards. And vice versa, if otherwise. We, however,
do not have good reasons to think that there is a correlation. So for now, we proceed as if the
tosses are random.
Another caveat about interpretation before we present the results. As we discuss in the
introduction, we cannot estimate the actual advantage of winning a toss. We can only estimate
the net observed advantage, which is the extent to which the teams capitalize on the potential
advantage. With that, the results.
The team that wins the toss wins the match 2.8% more often than the team that loses the toss.
This is a reasonable sized advantage in a competitive sport — though likely much smaller than the
4For more information on move to neutral umpires, see Neutral Umpires by S. Rajesh on ESPNcricinfo.
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number that most commentators carry in their heads. This advantage, however, varies by format,
by conditions, by whether or not a particular formula was used to adjust scores when it rains, and
how much better the team that won the toss is vis-à-vis the competing team. Much of the
variability follows expected patterns.
The conventional wisdom among lay cricket followers is that toss grants the greatest
advantage in multi-day aUairs like tests and Vrst class matches, followed by day long aUairs, and
Twenty20s. And there is good dose of common sense behind the conventional wisdom. Pitches
invariably deteriorate over multiple days and batting last in a test match is often the most
challenging time to bat. The pitch deteriorates far less over the course of the day, or in case of
Twenty20s, a few hours. And indeed unlimited over matches provide the greatest advantage— the
average advantage over FC and test matches is north of 2.6% (see Figure 1). Looked in relative
terms, the advantage of winning the toss is also close to the greatest in multi-day aUairs. Only
about 60% of test matches end in a clear decision, the rest end in a draw. Thus, the advantage is
closer to 4.5%. The heftiest raw advantage, however, is in one-day matches (List A and ODIs),
approximately 3.3%. In T20s and T20Is, the advantage is considerably smaller, just about 1.27%.5
And unlike the estimate of advantage for multi-day and one-day aUairs, we cannot statistically
reject that the possibility that there is no advantage.
Type of matches are but one source of variation and theorizing about the advantage granted
by the toss. It is often claimed that the toss is more crucial in day and night matches. Due to
dew—it is thought to make bowling hard, and the visibility of the white ball is thought to be
lower under lights, which makes catching hard—the team that Velds second is thought to be at a
disadvantage. The conventional wisdom is largely vindicated for one day aUairs (see Figure 2). In
one-day matches, the advantage of winning the toss in a day and night match is 5.92%, whereas
the advantage of winning the toss in a one-dayer played during the day is less than half—2.89%.
In Twenty20s—domestic and international—, however, we cannot distinguish between the
advantage granted by the toss in day and night matches and day time aUairs.
Weather has a large impact on the playing conditions in cricket. For instance, cool overcast
weather is thought to aid swing bowling, especially on certain pitches. More generally, the
advantage of winning the toss likely varies by weather. However, we do not have data on weather.
But, we can proxy it with seasons. In particular, students of the game suspect that the advantage
of winning the toss in early English season is especially great. We next assess whether that is so.
There is some evidence of a seasonal pattern, with advantage of winning the toss somewhat
greater in spring and early summer (May and June) than in mid and late summer and early fall
(July to September) 3. However, the thing that catches attention is the large disadvantage of
winning the toss in April. We don’t have a good explanation for the pattern, except for teams
choosing badly.
Aside from aUecting the playing conditions, weather aUects cricket matches in other, more
forceful ways—interrupting, and sometimes ending matches. When a limited over match that is
already underway is interrupted by bad weather, and more than a certain amount of time is lost
5Splitting data by whether the match was domestic or international yields some additional insights. Like De Silva
and Swartz (1998), who based on analysis of data from 427 international one-day matches conclude that ‘winning the
toss at the outset of a match provides no competitive advantage’ in one-day international matches, we Vnd that in
ODIs teams that win the toss win games at about the same rate as those that lose the toss. For Vrst-class and test
matches, the advantage to winning the toss is roughly the same. Meanwhile in Twenty20s, the advantage of winning
the toss is greater in international than domestic matches.
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Figure 1: DiUerence in Winning Percentages of Teams that Won the Toss and Teams that Lost the
Toss by Type of Match.
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Note: Means and 95% conVdence intervals. n refers to the number of matches.
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Figure 2: DiUerence in Winning Percentages of Teams that Won the Toss and Teams that Lost the
Toss by Day or Day and Night
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Figure 3: DiUerence in Winning Percentages of Teams that Won the Toss and Teams that Lost the
Toss by Month in England
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due to the interruption, the match is curtailed and the total that the team batting second must
achieve to win is adjusted using a method invented by Duckworth and Lewis (see Duckworth and
Lewis, 1998).6
We can use the random nature of who wins the toss to see if winning percentages of the
teams that win the toss are strongly conditioned by whether or not Duckworth-Lewis is used. If
the advantage of winning the toss in matches using Duckworth-Lewis is diUerent from matches
that don’t use it, it suggests that the Duckworth-Lewis method is biased. (For a precise estimate
of the bias, ideally, we would want to compare matches using Duckworth-Lewis method with
matches held in similar conditions.)
In both one-day and Twenty20 matches, the advantage of winning the toss in a match where
the target is adjusted using Duckworth-Lewis, is considerably greater (see Figure 4). In one-day
matches, the advantage is 5.35% in matched adjudicated by Duckworth-Lewis and 3.17% in
matches that don’t use it. Statistically, the chances that the two numbers are the same is less than
10%. (And if you make the plausible assumption that winning a toss only improves the chances of
winning, the chance that the two numbers are the same is half that.) In Twenty 20s, the
advantage of winning the toss shrinks from 3.9% in matches using Duckworth-Lewis to 1.17% in
matches without it. Once again, the chance that the two numbers are the same is about 10%.
Winning the toss ought to matter the most when the diUerence between the quality of the
teams that are playing is the least. Similarly, it is unlikely that winning the toss would change
who wins the game when two ill-matched teams are playing. To study the issue, we collected
data on team quality. The ICC publishes team ratings for international test and one-day teams
each month.7 Ratings of the men’s ODI teams have been published since 1981, and of the test
teams, since 1952. Of the entire ranking dataset, that spans 1981–today and 1952–today for ODI
and test teams respectively, we only have we have data till 2013.8
Team ratings range from 0 to 143 in our data. For instance, Bangladesh had a rating of 0 in
tests for most of 2002 and 2003. And Australia in 2007 twice held a rating of 143. We measure
how closely matched the teams by diUerencing the ranking points of one team from the other.
Commercial considerations mean that a majority of the games are played among highly ranked
and closely matched teams. Thus, the precision of our estimates is greatest for matches between
closely matched teams.
The results are expected, but new. As Figure 5 — which plots percentage of matches won or
drawn by the team that won the toss— illustrates, there is a sharp curve around 0. When closely
matched teams win, winning the toss has a large impact on the probability of winning.
Lastly, we investigate how the advantage varies by country winning the toss in international
matches. Are some countries better than others at capitalizing on a toss win? We investigated the
question by tallying the advantage by team that wins the toss. As 6 illustrates, all of our estimates
are imprecise enough that we cannot say with conVdence that any of the teams capitalizes on
winning the toss. Neither can we discount the possibility that the actual diUerences across the
teams are zero. The most puzzling result is from New Zealand. Like Shafqat (2015), data suggest
6Before the Duckworth and Lewis method was adopted, weather aUected matches sometimes continued on the
next day; an extra day was deliberately left in the schedule for dealing with such eventualities. In cases where the
spare day proved inadequate, the match was declared a draw.
7For details about how the ICC produces these ratings, see ICC Rating FAQs.
8The format in which the ICC publishes the ratings changed in 2013. And scraping the latter data posed additional
hurdles. We decided that the additional eUort wasn’t worth the small amount of additional data.
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Figure 4: DiUerence in Winning Percentages of Teams that Won the Toss and Teams that Lost the
Toss by Whether or not Duckworth-Lewis was invoked
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Figure 5: Percentage of Matches Won Minus Matches Lost After Winning the Toss by DiUerence
in Ranks
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Note: Smoothed relationship between diUerence in ranks and winning probability by whether or not the team won
the toss.
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that New Zealand does more poorly in matches where it wins tosses than where it loses it. On the
other hand, Sri Lanka and India appear to do especially well, winning 3.85% and 3.09% additional
matches, respectively, when they win the toss. Australia, Pakistan, and West Indies hover around
1–1.5%, and England is at 2.29%.
Figure 6: DiUerence in Winning Percentages of Teams that Won the Toss and Teams that Lost the
Toss by Country
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Till now, we have focused on assessing the impact of winning the toss on the probability of
winning, and how the impact is conditioned by playing conditions, by the type of match, and by
the teams involved. Winning the toss, however, likely not only aUects the probability of winning,
but also the margin of victory. But before we assess the impact of winning the toss on the margin
of victory, a short primer.
In limited over matches, when the team chasing the total falls short, the margin of victory is
given in diUerence in runs. When the team is able to successfully chase the total, the margin of
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victory is the given by two numbers: number of balls remaining, and the number of wickets in
hand. In unlimited overs matches, the metrics for margin of victory diUer in two small ways. We
don’t tally the number of balls remaining when the winning team achieves the target (principally
we could). Instead, we note whether or not the winning team had to bat twice—whether or not
the team won by an ‘innings’ and additional runs.
Teams that win the toss and the match in Vrst-class and test matches win with more wickets
in hand (Mean = 6.91) than winning teams that lose the toss (Mean = 6.64). In one-dayers and
Twenty20s, the teams that win the toss and the match have about the same number of wickets in
hand as the teams that lose the toss but win the match (One-Day: MeanLose Toss = 5.57,
MeanWin Toss = 5.65; Twenty20: MeanLose Toss = 6.37; MeanWin Toss = 6.21).
In Vrst-class and test matches teams that win the toss and the match also win by few more
runs on average (Mean = 136.48; Median = 124) than teams that lose the toss but win the match
(Mean = 133.71; Median = 122). Similarly, in Twenty20s, the team that wins the toss wins by a
few more runs (Mean = 37.60; Median = 28) than team that loses it (Mean = 34.50; Median
= 26). In one-dayers, however, the margin of victory is largely indistinguishable across cases
where the winning team wins the toss and where it loses it (MeanLose Toss = 63.95,
MedianLose Toss = 51; MeanWin Toss = 63.15, MedianWin Toss = 51).
Similar patterns hold for balls remaining—teams that win the toss generally win with a few
more balls remaining than teams that lose the toss. In one-day matches, MeanLose Toss = 49.87,
MedianLose Toss = 28, MeanWin Toss = 53.27, and MedianWin Toss = 30. And in Twenty20s,
MeanLose Toss = 18.69, MedianLose Toss = 12, MeanWin Toss = 16.41, and MedianWin Toss = 10.
And lastly, on number of innings, the teams that win the toss win by an innings about as
often as teams that lose the toss (MeanLose Toss = 22.26%, MeanWin Toss = 22.43%).
Discussion
The data suggest that winning the toss has a sizable impact on the probability of winning,
especially in closely contested games. The data also suggest that the advantage varies
considerably and systematically —in expected ways—, with advantage greater in day and night
matches, matches in which Duckworth-Lewis is used to adjust scores, and where the match is
played between closely matched teams. In showing so, the data lend credence to, and quantify,
the suspicion that many of the cricket fans have long had—that tosses matter. Besides that, the
data also help quantify the bias in Duckworth-Lewis method. More generally, the analysis we do
here could be replicated elsewhere to assess bias in competing methods, and used to prove that a
particular method is better or worse than the Duckworth-Lewis.
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